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Abstract
Functional MRI (fMRI)-based lie detection has been marketed as a tool for enhancing personnel selection,
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been asked to admit the results of lie detection scans as evidence during trials. How well does fMRIbased lie detection perform, and how should the courts, and society more generally, respond? Here, we
address various questions — some of which are based on a meta-analysis of published studies —
concerning the scientific state of the art in fMRI-based lie detection and its legal status, and discuss
broader ethical and societal implications. We close with three general policy recommendations.
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Abstract
FMRI lie detection has been marketed as a tool for enhancing personnel selection,
strengthening national security and protecting personal reputations, and at least three US courts
have been asked to admit the results of lie detection scans as evidence at trial. How well does
fMRI lie detection perform, and how should the courts, and society more generally, respond?
Here we address a sequence of questions concerning the scientific state of the art in fMRI lie
detection followed by consideration of its legal status and broader ethical and societal
implications. Scientifically, we begin by reporting a meta-analysis of the literature, which
indicates that reliable patterns of activation are associated with deception across different tasks
and laboratories. However, we also find that other psychological processes are confounded with
deception in many tasks and may be responsible for the observed fMRI effects attributed to
deception. Finally, we review a number of unmet scientific challenges concerning the
generalizability of current laboratory research on lie detection to the real world. Regarding the
impact of fMRI on society, we review its current legal status, the standards by which it will
continue to be judged, and consider the potential consequences and ethical principles at stake
when and if fMRI lie detection were to be adopted in specific contexts. We close with three
general policy recommendations.

	
  

Over the centuries human beings have devised many different methods for the detection
of deception (BOX 1). Some are low-tech, for example the skilled recognition of facial
expressions, and some are high, including the polygraph, a device that measures autonomic
arousal and is known in popular culture as the “lie detector.” At the present time, no method of
lie detection has been proven to perform with high accuracy in the field, and the search for a
better method continues.1
Recent efforts to detect lies have focused on measures of brain function rather than
autonomic nervous system activity. The appeal of this approach is that, in contrast to previous
methods that detected the emotional arousal resulting from deception, brain-based lie detection
measures physiological changes related to cognition during deception, and could therefore, in
principle, be detecting the process of deception itself. Most functional imaging attempts to
discriminate lying from truth-telling have employed functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI), although a few early studies used positron emission tomography (PET) and other
methods (event-related potentials and functional near infrared spectroscopy) have been applied
to the related problem of detecting concealed knowledge.2,3 Scientific and legal interest in fMRI
lie detection has developed rapidly. The majority of scientific articles have been published within
the last decade, and there have been at least three attempts to have fMRI lie detection admitted
into United States courts since 2010.
In the present article, we assess the current state of the science in fMRI lie detection and
review some of the legal and societal issues raised by this technology. Beginning with the
science, we address three questions about the current state of the art in fMRI lie detection. First,
do current findings on lie detection, from different laboratories and using different experimental
tasks, identify a consistent set of brain regions and, if so, which areas are they? Second, how
	
  

confidently can we interpret the results of these studies with respect to the neural substrates of
deception per se, and what alternative interpretations have yet to be ruled out? Third, what
additional challenges do we face in the effort to use fMRI for the detection of deception in realworld contexts? We then raise a series of issues concerning the ethical, legal and societal impact
of attempting to detect lies with fMRI.

The science of fMRI lie detection
Although fMRI lie detection has been commercialized and is used by some for real-world
applications, research on this topic began as a form of basic science, undertaken with the goal of
identifying the neural systems involved in deception.4-6 In such studies, blood-oxygen-level
dependent (BOLD) activity is measured under conditions in which subjects are instructed or
explicitly permitted to make deceptive versus truthful responses. Deception has been
operationalized in many different ways in fMRI lie detection research, as in lie detection
research more generally (Box 2). The designs of these studies are critical for understanding the
degree to which they successfully isolate the neural correlates of deception, so several examples
of research tasks will be given here.
In one of the earliest studies, subjects were given two playing cards and were instructed
to deny possession of one and acknowledge possession of the other.5 Subjects were scanned
while they viewed a series of cards, including the two critical cards and other cards they had not
been given. Activity associated with deception was isolated by comparing the lie and truth trials.
A similar task involved having subjects pick a number between 3 and 8, and then deny having
picked that number (the critical lie item) and deny having picked the other numbers (truth items)
while in the scanner viewing numbers.7 Here again, activity on lie trials was compared to that on
	
  

truth trials to discover which areas were associated with deception in this task.
A small step toward more realistic experimental paradigms to study lying was taken by
Andrew Kozel and colleagues.8 They devised a mock crime scenario, in which subjects were
given a choice whether to “steal” a ring or a watch and were instructed to place the chosen item
in a locker. Subsequently, they answered questions about the “crime” while in the scanner, and
were instructed to deny having taken either item. In addition to lies (denials regarding the item
they took) and truthful statements (denials regarding the item they did not take), subjects were
asked yes/no general knowledge questions such as “Is it 2004?” or “Do you live in the United
States?” The difference between the lie and truth trials was taken to index the neural activity
associated with lying. Finally, researchers have compared subjects’ responses when answering
questions about past events or personal information, for which they were cued to respond
truthfully or deceptively.9
In sum, for most fMRI studies of lie detection subjects are instructed by the
experimenters to lie and to tell the truth on specific trials of the experiment, and the activation
from these trials is either directly contrasted or compared after contrasting to a baseline
condition. The regions showing significantly greater activation for lies than truth are taken to be
the neural correlates of deception.

Consistency of results across laboratories and tasks. When the deceptive and truthful
response conditions of tasks are compared, activation is often found in certain regions,
particularly prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate cortex, and parietal cortex. How reliably are
these regions associated with deception, and can one identify more specific subregions within
these relatively broad anatomical areas that are activated during deception? While earlier reviews
	
  

of the literature found substantial consistency across studies 10-12, the literature has continued to
rapidly grow in recent years. Accordingly, to assess the consistency of deception-related activity
across laboratories and tasks, we carried out a new meta-analysis of the fMRI lie detection
literature to date.
Like the earlier analyses of Christ et al.11 and Wagner12, the present meta-analysis used
the activation likelihood estimation (ALE) method13 (for details, see Supplementary
Materials). ALE quantifies the degree of anatomical overlap across published neuroimaging
studies based on peak-voxel coordinate information. This enabled us to quantify the reliability of
anatomical overlap of activation foci observed, rather than simply analyzing commonalties in
terms of activations occurring in pre-selected regions of interest. Published lie detection studies
were included if they (1) used fMRI; (2) reported results from a whole-brain, group analysis of
healthy, young adults; (3) conducted a statistical contrast indexing deception, reporting one or
more foci in standardized coordinate space; and (4) reported data that were not reported (in part
or in full) in any other study included in the meta-analysis (that is, a given data set contributed to
the analysis only once). Critically, activations analyzed were group-level contrasts of deceptive
versus truthful responding (Table S1). As detailed in the Supplemental Materials, this analysis
was performed over 321 foci from 28 independent statistical contrasts between lie versus truth
conditions that were reported in 23 different studies.
As shown in Figure 1 (see also Table S2), the meta-analysis revealed a number of
regions that were active across studies at an above-chance rate, including bilateral dorsolateral
and ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, inferior parietal lobule, anterior insula, and medial superior
frontal cortex. As previously noted by others, there was also considerable variability from study
to study, as no region was active in all (or nearly all) studies. This may be due in part to
	
  

differences in tasks and stimuli9, in data acquisition procedures (e.g., magnet field strength,
acquired functional data resolution, as well as the number of trials per condition and number of
subjects, both of which impact statistical power), and in statistical procedures (e.g., choice of
statistical thresholds). Nevertheless, across studies there is considerable agreement on the
question of which brain areas are more active during instructed lying compared with truthtelling.
Could the patterns documented by this meta-analysis provide the scientific foundation for
a useful lie detector? We suggest that several other empirical questions need to be addressed
before fMRI lie detection can be considered for real-world use. Are the observed brain
activations due to deception per se or to confounds within the experimental designs? More
generally, is the observed activation specific to lying or does it reflect something about the way
lies are usually (but not necessarily or invariably) produced? Can fMRI discriminate lies from
truth in individual subjects with sufficient accuracy to be useful in at least some circumstances?
For what types of subjects? Do laboratory-derived indicators generalize to the real world, where
stakes and hence emotions may be high, where base rates may be unknown, and where subjects
may attempt countermeasures?

Experimental confounds and other questions of specificity. The experimental designs used in
fMRI studies of deception are most naturally described in terms such as “lie” and “truth,” and
this language encourages a certain presumption of specificity. However, on the basis of simple
experimental contrasts between lie and truth we cannot know what psychological processes other
than deception might evoke the same patterns of activity. What can we conclude from the
current literature concerning the specificity of deception-related activation?
	
  

In most of the tasks used to study deception with fMRI, a number of experimental factors
are confounded with the lie versus truth manipulation.7, 12, 14, 15 For example, in one study 16, 17,
BOLD activity differed between instructed lie and truth trials. However, the frequency of the
motor response required on truth trials was much lower than that of the motor response required
on lie trials. Because of this confound, rather than reflecting neural correlates of deception,
critical aspects of these data may reflect neural responses associated with selecting a frequent
versus an infrequent motor action.
In an experiment with even broader implications for the interpretation of extant fMRI lie
detection data, Hakun and colleagues7 carried out an experiment in which subjects were scanned
while viewing a series of numbers after having chosen one in advance. In one condition, subjects
were instructed to lie, by responding that they had not chosen the number when it was shown
during scanning. In a different condition, subjects simply viewed the numbers without
responding during scanning. Strikingly, in three out of three subjects, Hakun observed greater
lateral prefrontal and parietal activation to the chosen number relative to other numbers when
subjects simply passively viewed the numbers as well as when they were instructed to lie about
the chosen number. This finding suggests that in many of the studies in our meta-analysis, the
greater activity observed for instructed lie stimuli may not reflect neural processes related to
deception, but rather may reflect other cognitive differences produced by the task. For example,
the mere act of selecting a stimulus at the outset of the experiment (be it a selecting a specific
number from the range 3 to 8, or selecting a ring rather than a watch from a drawer) may attach
particular significance to the stimulus that alters subsequent cognitive responses to the stimulus
when it appears during fMRI scanning. The selected stimulus may be more salient relative to the
other (“truth”) stimuli, resulting in differential engagement of neural mechanisms of attentional
	
  

orienting, and the selected stimulus may also be associated with stronger or richer memories,
resulting in differential engagement of neural mechanisms of memory. Are the activation
differences between “lie” and “truth” stimuli due to the act of deception, or to such confounding
effects of attention and memory?
The presence of memory confounds in fMRI lie detection studies was directly addressed
in an important study by Gamer et al.14 In that study, subjects were instructed to encode into
memory critical items (a banknote and playing card), and were then later scanned while simply
viewing the critical items and control items (subjects pressed a button to indicate each stimulus’s
presentation). Because this stimulus viewing task did not require subjects to respond deceptively
or truthfully, differences in BOLD signal between the critical items and control items must be
due to differences in the items’ histories; that is, whether the subject does or does not have a
memory for the item. Strikingly, the results revealed greater activation to the critical items versus
control items in prefrontal and anterior insular cortical areas previously observed in fMRI studies
comparing instructed lie versus truth trials. Because memory and attention confounds are present
in many fMRI lie detection studies, these data, along with those of Hakun et al.7, cast doubt on
whether the existing literature bears on the question of whether there are consistent neural
correlates of deception per se.
Related to the preceding concerns about experimental confounds is the broader issue of
process (or functional) specificity. Even if it were possible to correct the memory and attention
confounds inherent in the tasks just described, there would likely remain an association between
deception, on the one hand, and executive function and other cognitive processes, on the other,
because deception generally places more demands on executive functions and memory compared
to truthful responding. The liar must generally keep two versions of events in working memory
	
  

and inhibit the more natural response of responding in accordance with reality. It has been noted
that the regions associated with deception in the fMRI lie detection literature are also associated
with executive function, attention, and memory processes, consistent with this association
between deception and cognitive load.10,11 As many have argued, it is possible that fMRI lie
detection is measuring differences in engagement of these more general‐purpose cognitive
processes. To the extent that deception does not necessarily (but only typically) impose a higher
cognitive load than truth telling, it may be possible to dissociate the two. Under certain
circumstances, true responding could tax these processes to an equivalent or greater extent than
deceptive responding, a pattern which has in fact been found in at least once instance.18 Thus,
despite the encouraging consistency revealed by the meta-analysis (Figure 1; Table S2), truthtelling could be mistakenly interpreted as deception according to current methods of fMRI lie
detection.

Translational challenges: From the laboratory to the real world.
Even if all of the uncertainties just described could be resolved, many other issues would
have to be addressed before fMRI lie detection could be used responsibly in the real world. We
turn to these issues here.

Inferences about individual subjects. Real-world uses of lie detection will of course involve
inferences about the truthfulness or deceit of individuals. What do the published studies tell us
about the accuracy with which deception can be identified at the individual level? Most
publications report only group analyses, making them poorly suited to answering this question.
Of the minority of studies reporting statistics that are directly relevant to assessing accuracy at
	
  

the level of individual subjects or individual events 2, 7, 8, 16, 17, 19-27 , only two studies (to our
knowledge) report data relevant to detecting deception at the individual event level. Specifically,
using the same dataset, Langleben et al.16 and Davatzikos et al.17 focused on whether instructed
lie and truth events could be discriminated, using either logistic regression16 or non-linear
machine learning analyses17. Although these event-level analyses yielded accuracy rates of 78%
and 88%, respectively, the impact of these early findings is limited because of the above-noted
response frequency confound in the experimental design.
Other studies focused on examining whether fMRI BOLD activity differs when an
individual is lying compared to telling the truth (pooling data across events). A variety of
statistical approaches have been implemented, including single-subject univariate analyses
7,19,20,21

, univiariate analyses combined with the counting of above-threshold voxels in targeted

regions of interest 8, 22, 25, and machine learning classification.2 The reported accuracies in these
individual-subject level analyses have ranged from 69-100%, suggesting promise. However, here
again the noted concerns about attention and memory confounds undermine data
interpretation.7,12,26 The problem of confounds remains whether the neural correlates of
deception are sought using univariate or multivariate analyses, and whether the correlates are
discovered by simple regression analysis or machine learning algorithms, so long as the data
comes from tasks that do not separate the effects of deception from the effects of attention and
memory. Furthermore, even high accuracy rates may decline precipitously when subjects use
countermeasures in an attempt to conceal their ‘deception.’ 2
The laboratory studies assessing the accuracy of fMRI lie detection on the individualsubject level assess the sensitivity and specificity within an individual by differentiating trials on
which the individual is deceptive or truthful. However, determining the accuracy of a test in a
	
  

general population also requires an assessment of the test’s sensitivity and specificity across
individuals within that population. That is, what is the likelihood of detecting deception when it
is present in a member of the population, and what is the likelihood of correctly indicating when
deception is absent. In addition, determining the real-world accuracy of a detection test depends
on a critical third factor, which is the probability of the event occurring within the population, or
the base rate. To date, fMRI lie detection tests examining accuracy within individuals have
generally not assessed the specificity of the test across individuals. One exception is a study by
Kozel and colleagues22, which tested participants that had been successfully classified as ‘lying’
on a prior mock crime task (25 of 36 participants). These preselected participants were then
examined on a secondary mock crime task. On this secondary task, some of the participants
committed the mock crime and others did not, but all were instructed to indicate that they didn’t.
Kozel et al. were able to correctly detect deception in 100% of the participants in the ‘mock
crime present’ condition. However, they also mistakenly detected deception in 67% of the
participants in the ‘mock crime absent’ condition. In the language of diagnostic testing, the
sensitivity of this test was high but the specificity was low.
Note that the risks associated with such low specificity will depend on the base rate of
lying in the population assessed 29, 30. Imagine this test were given to 101 people, 100 of them
truthful and one deceptive. Based on the false positive rates of Kozel and colleagues the test
would identify 68 participants as ‘lying’ -- the 1 participant who lied about the mock crime and
67 who did not. In other words, given a positive result, the probability of the test accurately
indicating someone as lying is 1 in 68, or less than 1.5%, and the likelihood of incorrectly
indicating deception when it is not present is over 98%. As this example illustrates, even in an
ideal circumstance in which a laboratory lie detection test is developed and used in identical
	
  

situations, and is able to detect deception within an individual 100% of the time, its accuracy in a
larger population may still be unacceptably low if the specificity of the test is low and the base
rate of lying is low.
The real-world validity of fMRI lie detection will also depend on the generalizability of
the findings obtained with laboratory subjects (typically healthy, educated young adults, i.e.,
undergraduates) to the individuals whose veracity is to be assessed by these methods. Consider
the differences between criminal offenders, a group likely to be subjected to lie detection
methods, and the university samples on which these methods have so far been tested. A
relatively high proportion of criminals meet the criteria for psychopathy, a condition associated
with frequent acts of deception, which has been linked to differences in both structural and
functional MRI studies.27 A study of fMRI lie detection in criminal offenders with a diagnosis
related to psychopathy, specifically anti-social personality disorder, found that a large proportion
of these participants did not show typical prefrontal BOLD response patterns during instructed
deception.28
Cognitive, personality and brain factors associated with a wide range of individual
differences may also affect the validity of fMRI lie detection. Structural and functional MRI
changes observed with advancing age, a range of psychopathologies (e.g., schizophrenia, PTSD)
or individual traits (e.g., high anxiety, extraversion) limit the applicability of lie detection tests
that have not been validated in these populations. There may also be important individual
differences in the neural systems of deception per se that we have yet to characterize. In a clever
study in which participants were given the opportunity to gain money by being dishonest, those
who tended toward dishonesty showed increased BOLD signal in regions related to cognitive
control when behaving dishonestly and when behaving honestly, whereas participants who
	
  

tended to be honest did not show this pattern.18

Differences between lies in the lab and in real life. Another potential obstacle to real-world lie
detection is that the lies examined in laboratory tasks are generally quite unlike those that we
would try to detect outside of the laboratory (BOX 2). Although researchers have been
concerned with real-world effectiveness, and have presented their studies as “ecologically
valid”29 or “emulat[ing] as closely as possible a real world situation”30, the tasks differ in many
important ways from the situations in which lie detection would be used in the real world. In the
laboratory studies, subjects lie because they are instructed to, about matters with little personal
relevance, in highly constrained and contrived situations. In addition, the familiarity of the
information being concealed and the level of emotion associated with it are typically much lower
in laboratory studies than in real life.
Consider the situation in which a lie is highly rehearsed and thus familiar, and the truth is
abhorrent. In this circumstance it seems very possible that truth telling is more effortful than
lying. There is evidence from both fMRI and behavioral studies suggesting practice or rehearsal
may alter the neural signature of deception. As indicated in Figure 1, some of the regions
commonly activated in fMRI studies of lie detection include prefrontal regions hypothesized to
underlie cognitive functions required during the more effortful ‘lie’ condition. Studies examining
practice effects across a number of cognitive tasks routinely show diminished prefrontal cortex
activation. 31 This reduction is thought to reflect the diminished executive control required as
highly practiced tasks become automatic. An early fMRI study of lie detection found that
memorized lies resulted in less BOLD activation when compared to unpracticed lies in every
deception-related region of interest identified except for one hypothesized to be involved in
	
  

memory retrieval.9 In a behavioral deception study, it was found the training on deception
eliminated pre-training reaction time differences between deception and truth trials, consistent
with enhanced automaticity of lying.32 Outside the laboratory, if one is anticipating interrogation
about a lie it is very likely the lie will be practiced and memorized, which might eliminate many
of the detectable differences in the behavioral and neural expression of deception.
In addition, real-world deception is likely to be highly emotional and personally relevant.
Emotion could impact the neural circuitry of lying in two ways that might make it more difficult
to distinguish truth from lies. First, truthfully answering questions about highly emotional events
may be more effortful or require more (emotional) control/inhibition than truthfully answering
questions about neutral events. To the extent that a lie detection test is measuring non-specific
brain signals of effort or inhibition, it may be more likely a true statement about an emotional
event is classified as a lie (as has been found with event-related potentials by Proverbio et al.,
2013).33 However, it is also the case that emotional qualities of the event may shift the neural
signature of deception to make it less likely a lie is detected. In fMRI studies, emotion has been
shown to alter the neural circuitry of memory34, inhibition and cognitive control35, and working
memory interference36, all processes believed to underlie the differences between brain activity
accompanying deceptive and truthful responses. Indeed, emotional valence has been found to
affect the neural localizations of deception-related processing.37 If a lie detection test is
developed based on lying about non-emotional events, its applicability to assessing deception
concerning emotional or important, personally relevant events may be limited.

Countermeasures. Methods of lie detection inevitably spawn methods designed to evade
detection, so the mere possibility of countermeasures should not be grounds for rejection of
	
  

fMRI lie detection. However, the ease and success of countermeasures are relevant to the realworld usefulness of fMRI lie detection. In the one study cited earlier reporting 100% accuracy,
the investigators further demonstrated that if subjects adopt a simple countermeasure strategy of
making imperceptible finger and toe movements, accuracy fell to 33%. At present researchers
have only begun to explore possible countermeasures for fMRI lie detection. Unpublished data
from the lab of ADW, focused on whether subjects can conceal memory-related patterns of
BOLD signal, also indicate that countermeasure strategies can reduce machine learning decoding
of memory states from well above chance to chance levels.38,39
In sum, even if the challenges facing fMRI studies of deception in the laboratory,
described in the previous section, were met, a number of additional challenges await the
successful translation of this method into the real world. The accuracy with which individual
subjects can be assessed when telling lies or truth, and the suitability of these accuracy rates
given the base rates of lying and truth-telling in the population, demands a major new empirical
research effort. How these accuracies vary as a function of an individual’s age, health,
personality, life history and other variables are also crucial questions and would require an even
larger program of research to adequately address. Just as differences among individuals would be
expected to influence the validity of the method, so too would differences in the nature of the lie
and its context: whether the subject has lived with the lie for a long time, whether the truth is
more emotionally charged than the lie, and what is at stake if the lie is discovered. Finally, the
susceptibility of fMRI lie detection to countermeasures would need to be more fully explored
before it is applied in the real world, and this too requires extensive research.

Current status of real-world fMRI lie detection
	
  

FMRI lie detection has moved rapidly from the basic research lab into commercial
application in the real world. In 2006 two companies began offering fMRI lie detection services,
No Lie MRI, based on the method developed by Langleben and colleagues at the University of
Pennsylvania, and Cephos, based on the method of Kozel and colleagues at the University of
Texas. These companies have suggested a number of uses for fMRI lie detection, spanning
business, family life, criminal justice and national security contexts. For example, No Lie MRI
recommends its services for such diverse problems as combating insurance fraud
(http://www.noliemri.com/customers/GroupOrCorporate.htm), increasing public trust of US and
foreign leaders (http://www.noliemri.com/customers/Government.htm) and “risk reduction in
dating” (http://www.noliemri.com/customers/Individuals.htm).
The potential application of fMRI lie detection that has received the greatest public
scrutiny has been for assessing the truthfulness of legal testimony. In at least three cases, US
courts have been asked to admit evidence from fMRI lie detection. The courts determine
admissibility by applying one of two standards, depending on jurisdiction. Both standards are
designed to keep “junk science” from influencing jury decisions, although they do so in different
ways. According to the Frye standard, set forth in Frye v United States in 1923, admissibility
hinges on the general acceptance of the method within its particular scientific field. According
to the Daubert standard, set forth in 1993 by the US Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow,
judges in federal cases must be more active gate-keepers of scientific evidence in court, rather
than simply deferring to general scientific opinion. In doing so, they should take five factors
(among others they may consider relevant) into account in making their decisions: whether the
method is testable, and has been tested; whether it has been reported in peer-reviewed
publications; whether there is a known or potentially knowable error rate; whether there are
	
  

standards for the way in which the method is used; and finally, as in Frye, whether the method is
generally accepted within the relevant scientific community.
The first two attempts to introduce fMRI lie detection occurred in 2010. In the first case,
Wilson v. Corestaff Services, the plaintiff in an employment discrimination case sought to
introduce evidence gathered by Cephos to support the credibility of a witness’ testimony. The
judge in this case ruled the evidence inadmissible on the grounds that credibility assessment is
the job of the jury, but also noted that the method would not meet the Frye criteria, stating “even
a cursory review of the scientific literature demonstrates that the plaintiff is unable to establish
that the use of the fMRI test to determine truthfulness or deceit is accepted as reliable in the
relevant scientific community” (Wilson v. Corestaff Services, 2010).
In the second case, US v Semrau, the defendant standing trial for Medicare fraud claimed
that he did not intentionally violate the law and sought to present the results of fMRI lie
detection as evidence that his testimony was truthful. A hearing was held in Memphis Federal
Court, before a Magistrate Judge to whom had been delegated the task of making a
recommendation on admissibility, to determine whether fMRI lie detection meets the Daubert
criteria. The 39-page opinion included the recommendation (later accepted by the presiding
district judge) that the fMRI evidence be excluded. The analysis noted: (a) the lack of general
acceptance for the method within the scientific community, (b) the substantial differences
between laboratory research designs and the real-world use of fMRI lie detection in this case, (c)
the lack of “real-life” error rates; and d) the lack of suitably controlling standards for the use of
the method. (The latter determination was prompted by Cephos’ discounting of one of three
scanning sessions, which had indicated deception, on the grounds that the defendant was
fatigued.) However, the opinion also observes that precise validation in real-world contexts, of
	
  

the sort that scientists might in their own research require, is not always legally necessary: “in
the future, should fMRI-based lie detection undergo further testing, development, and peer
review, improve upon standards controlling the technique’s operation, and gain acceptance by
the scientific community for use in the real world, this methodology may be found to be
admissible even if the error rate is not able to be quantified in a real world setting” (US v
Semrau, 2010).
In the case of Smith v. State of Maryland, the defendant was being retried for seconddegree murder in 2012 and sought to introduce evidence of the truthfulness of his own testimony
from No Lie MRI. The judge refused to admit the evidence based on the Frye standard, after
concluding that experts in the field (including ADW and EAP) did not agree with the company’s
experts, suggesting lack of ”general acceptance”.

Legal, social and ethical considerations
Science can, in principle, tell us the accuracy of fMRI lie detection for any particular population
of individuals under any particular circumstances we might specify. It cannot, however, tell us
how accurate fMRI lie detection should be for any particular use to which it might be put. That
decision depends on the needs and values of the people using the method. We have seen that the
legal system has criteria, developed in legal cases that involved scientific evidence other than
fMRI lie detection, for deciding when a method has sufficient validation, namely the Frye and
Daubert criteria. These criteria make clear the interdependence and the independence of
scientific and societal decision-making. While scientific research provides essential input into
decisions regarding admissibility, the decisions themselves are not made by the kinds of
conventional scientific criteria applied, for example, by reviewers of research articles. It is fair
	
  

to say that, in some respects, legal standards may be lower than scientific standards where
scientific evidence such as fMRI lie detection is concerned. As argued by Fred Shauer in an
article entitled “Can Bad Science Be Good Evidence?,” the societal needs served by the law
often require a more pragmatic approach to the vetting of scientific evidence. In the absence of
better methods of discovering the truth, an imperfect method may be better than nothing: “… the
exclusion of substandard science, when measured by scientific standards, may have the perverse
effect of lowering the accuracy and rigor of legal fact-finding, because the exclusion of flawed
science will only increase the importance of the even more flawed non-science that now
dominates legal fact-finding.”40 As Langleban and Moriarity have noted2013, this reasoning can
be extended to other scientific methods as well, given that many of the methods of forensic
science have been found wanting. NRC2009
As scientists we are not accustomed to endorsing methods on the grounds that they are
“lesser evils.” The difference between the scientific and legal approach to accepting questionable
sources of evidence rests in part on the scientist’s choice of hypotheses to test. If no good
method is available to test a certain hypothesis, then a scientist will normally simply decline to
test it. The legal system cannot make the analogous decision; the question of “guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt” must be addressed with the evidence available, even when that evidence is
acknowledged to have serious weaknesses.
What about societal decision-making regarding potential uses of fMRI lie detection
outside the courtroom? The world has only begun to engage with the question of how best to
use, and limit the use of, fMRI lie detection. Questions concerning the necessary degrees of
accuracy and validity will undoubtedly require different answers for different tasks in different
contexts, according to the potential benefits of correct lie detection, the costs of wrong calls, and
	
  

the intersection of this technology with moral principles such as the right to privacy.

How accurate is accurate enough? The most immediate ethical and social issues raised by
fMRI lie detection arise because of the method’s lack of demonstrated accuracy and validity.
Given the scientific and technical problems reviewed earlier, the most likely harms would result
from false determinations, both lies wrongly identified as truths and truthful statements wrongly
identified as lies. The history of polygraphy offers tragic reminders of the cost, in national
security and human life, of overreliance on an apparently high tech but inaccurate method for
detecting deception. Some commentators have suggested a ban or moratorium on fMRI lie
detection, pending better evidence concerning its accuracy.41,42
In two well known instances of the polygraph’s false negatives, the American CIA agent
Aldrich Ames and the Jordanian CIA informant Humam Khalil Abu-Mulal al-Balawi both
passed polygraph testing, twice in the case of Ames. Yet Ames spent years selling American
secrets to the Soviets and Russians, and al-Balawi killed 7 CIA agents as a double agent. False
positive polygraph results have cost honest people job opportunities and even their liberty, as
when they lead to false confessions.43
Marks has pointed out that the impressive visual appearance of fMRI lie detection results
may eclipse concerns about the method’s technical weaknesses, including the likelihood of false
positives. He suggests that government agents interrogating detainees would naturally tend to
increase the aggressiveness of their tactics if a detainee’s fMRI indicates deception. Thus,
whereas lie detection methods might be thought to reduce the use of harsh interrogation, they
might instead be used to justify abusive treatment of detainees, a particularly deplorable outcome
in the case of false positive results.44
	
  

As noted earlier, false positives in fMRI lie detection will have the greatest negative
impact when the method is used to identify relatively rare cases of dishonesty in a population.
When applied to large numbers of mostly honest people, even modest false positive rates will
result in many wrongly accused individuals. Applications such as the routine screening of job
applicants or travelers are therefore problematic, as they would likely result in large numbers of
falsely accused individuals in relation to the occasional correct identification. As with other
questions concerning requirements for accuracy, the question of how many individuals we are
willing to falsely accuse of deception for the sake of an occasional correctly identified liar will
be determined not by research but by society’s needs and values.

Ethical issues beyond validity and accuracy. Not all ethical issues surrounding fMRI lie
detection depend on the method’s accuracy; even a technically perfect lie detector would raise
ethical issues and be subject to societal deliberation and regulation. Indeed, some issues would
become more pressing in the event of successful fMRI lie detection.
FMRI lie detection raises privacy issues that require societal control, much as we place
limits on other practices that intrude on privacy from DNA collection to wire-tapping. For
example, if everyone’s phone conversations and email messages were generally available to their
families, employers and the state, and if the DNA of all citizens were on file with law
enforcement authorities, much crime and misbehavior would be discovered or, better still,
averted. Yet societies place limits on the collection and use of such information in order to
protect personal privacy. An additional reason to limit access to such information is to increase
the benefit it provides to those in possession of its. Societal management of fMRI lie detection
would presumably be aimed at balancing the cost to individual privacy against the collective
	
  

benefits of reduced crime and terrorism, enhanced personnel selection and the generally
increased honesty between people that might result from the knowledge that the veracity of one’s
statements could be tested.
The legal framework for the protection of privacy includes the fourth and fifth
amendments, which several legal scholars have discussed in relation to fMRI lie detection and
other forms of brain imaging that provide psychological information.45-47 The fourth amendment
protects against warrantless search, including physical tests such as fMRI. The fifth amendment
protects against compelled self-incriminating testimony. It remains to be decided whether fMRI
lie detection should be viewed as physical evidence or testimony.48
Considerations of individual autonomy and freedom arise in connection with the process
of consenting to undergo fMRI lie detection. Consent procedures therefore constitute another
aspect of societal management that arises regardless of the method’s known accuracy. At
present, when accuracy in the real world is unknown and even laboratory accuracy estimates are
unavailable for subjects of different ages and states of health, subjects must understand the
questionable accuracy of the method in order to make an informed decision on their own behalf.
They must also understand that not all outside parties will interpret the results of the test with
appropriate caution. Even if accuracy is better demonstrated than at present, subjects must be
informed about the inevitably imperfect performance of the method. Consent is especially
fraught when testing is not requested by the subject but by another party, for example, the
government, an employer or a jealous spouse. Additional safeguards may be needed to prevent
coercion, including the indirect coercion that results when refusal to take the test is seen as
indicative of guilt.
In sum, the question of whether and how to use fMRI lie detection cannot be answered
	
  

solely on the basis of the method’s performance. No method will ever be known to have 100%
accuracy for any context in which it might be deployed. Deciding what level of uncertainty is
acceptable depends on how different kinds of outcomes are valued. Correct and incorrect
identifications of lies and of truth may be weighted very differently under different
circumstances and in different societies. For example, the priority placed on outcomes related to
security relative to the rights of individuals will determine whether it is worse to miss a liar or
falsely accuse an honest person. The strength of a society’s commitments to principles including
individual privacy, autonomy and freedom will also shape its policies concerning fMRI lie
detection.

Policy recommendations
How should the development and use of fMRI-based lie detection be managed, in light of
the scientific, legal, ethical and societal issues just reviewed? We offer three general
recommendations.
First, different policies should be considered for different applications of fMRI lie
detection. We do not join calls to ban fMRI lie detection across the board. Despite the enormous
shortcomings of current evidence, reviewed earlier, we suggest that restrictions should be
proportional to the outcomes and principles at stake. Risk reduction in dating calls for different
standards of certainty and different protections of individual rights than the interrogation of
terrorist suspects.
Second, publicly funded research should be undertaken to explore the potential of fMRI
lie detection, paying attention to conflicts of interest for researchers associated with companies
that offer the service. The two highest research priorities are, first, the removal of, or accounting
	
  

for, experimental confounds noted earlier and, second, the validation of the methods under more
realistic conditions, including with countermeasures and with more diverse subjects. If fMRI lie
detection passes these hurdles, then a substantial investment in real-world validation 44 of the
kind proposed by Peter Imrey50 would be justified.
Third, while acknowledging that the standards of science with regard to truth and
certainty may not always be the appropriate ones in legal and other societal contexts, scientists
have a vital role to play in the application of neuroscience to the law51. In the case of fMRI lie
detection, it is our duty to raise questions about the accuracy, validity and specificity of fMRI lie
detection, to provide accurate answers to these questions, and to communicate their relevance to
nonscientist citizens.
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Figure 1. Results of the ALE analysis of the fMRI “deception” literature. Overlay of map of
ALE values (orange) on the lateral (top) and medial (bottom) inflated PALS surface (Van Essen,
2005) revealing regions consistently implicated in deception across studies. Thresholded at p <
.05, False Discovery Rate corrected (per the method described in Eickhoff et al. 2009). MFG:
Middle frontal gyrus; IFG: Inferior frontal gyrus; IPL: Inferior parietal lobule; m/SFG:
medial/superior frontal gyrus
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